

Message Text

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TO USMISSION USUN NEWYORK NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE NIACT

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE NIACT

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, IS

SUBJECT: SINAI SUPPORT MISSION: VERIFICATION PROCEDURES
AT E-1 AND J-1 SITES

1. IN INITIAL DISCUSSIONS DURING VISIT OF THORNE AND SITE SURVEY TEAM TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL IN EARLY DECEMBER, GOE AND GOI CONSENTED TO GENERAL APPROACH TO US VERIFICATION OF OPERATIONS AT E-1 AND J-1, AS PROPOSED BY THORNE. THIS INCLUDED INITIAL INSPECTION ON FEBRUARY 22 OF ALL SPACES AND PERSONNEL WITHIN SITES; UNANNOUNCED SPOT INSPECTION OF ENTERING CARGO THEREAFTER; AND 24-HOUR PRESENCE OF US SINAI FIELD MISSION MEMBER AT ACCESS TO EACH SITE.

2. FINAL DETAILS OF US VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WERE NOT ESTABLISHED IN DECEMBER. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY BE
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FIXED PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 22, WHEN SINAI II AGREEMENT COMES

INTO EFFECT AND FORTHCOMING MEETING OF JOINT COMMISSION ON JANUARY 29 WOULD APPEAR TO BE EARLIEST APPROPRIATE OCCASION WHEN EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS CAN MUTUALLY ESTABLISH PRECISE GROUND RULES FOR VERIFICATION OF E-1 AND J-1, AS CALLED FOR BY US PROPOSAL IN CONNECTION WITH BASIC AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL TO AGREEMENT. FUNDAMENTAL POINT IS THAT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES MUST BE THE SAME FOR EACH SITE AND FULLY UNDERSTOOD BY EACH PARTY.

3. ACCORDINGLY, USUN SHOULD CONVEY TO URQUHART AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY OUR SUGGESTION THAT PROCEDURES BY WHICH US SHOULD INSPECT E-1 AND J-1 SITES BE DISCUSSED AND AGREED UPON BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL AT NEXT CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY. WE WOULD HOPE THAT SIILASVUO OR WHOEVER WILL REPRESENT HIM AT NEXT JOINT COMMISSION MEETING, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 29, COULD INTRODUCE SUBJECT AS AGENDA ITEM FOR DISCUSSION BY BOTH PARTIES AT THAT TIME. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE SUGGESTING TO BOTH GOI AND GOE SEPARATELY THAT THEY COME TO MEETING PREPARED TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF US VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, IN THE HOPE THAT THESE CAN BE FINALIZED PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 22.

4. YOU MAY INFORM URQUHART FOR HIS AND SIILASVUO'S BACKGROUND THAT IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH GOE AND GOI IN DECEMBER, BOTH AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO SITE INSPECTION OF SPACES AND OF NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL ON FEBRUARY 22, TO BE FOLLOWED THEREAFTER BY UNANNOUNCED SPOT INSPECTION OF ENTERING CARGO. WE NOW WOULD LIKE EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO DISCUSS BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND CONFIRM PRECISE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES US SHOULD APPLY. IN PARTICULAR, WE SUGGEST THAT FEBRUARY 22 INSPECTION INVOLVE VISUAL CHECK OF SPACES, PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES. WE ALSO SUGGEST THERE BE ONGOING UNANNOUNCED SPOT VISUAL INSPECTIONS BY US PERSONNEL OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ENTERING SITES AFTER FEBRUARY 22. AN APPROXIMATE COUNT OF PERSONNEL REMAINING ON-SITE AT ANY ONE TIME WOULD BE MAINTAINED. HOWEVER, WE WILL BE GUIDED BY WHATEVER THE TWO PARTIES AGREE ON THESE POINTS, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE CLEAR AGREEMENT. WE ALSO WISH RECONFIRMATION THAT US PERSONNEL WILL BE
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ADMITTED INTO ALL REPEAT ALL SPACES OF E-1 AND J-1 SITES ON FEBRUARY 22 FOR INITIAL INSPECTION.

5. FYI ONLY: THE US PROPOSAL WHICH WAS BASIS OF AGREEMENT BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON EARLY WARNING SYSTEM STATES THAT THE SURVEILLANCE STATIONS 'SHALL PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS OF VISUAL AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ONLY WITHIN THEIR STATIONS.' THE US ROLE AT THE SURVEILLANCE STATIONS

IS TO 'VERIFY THE NATURE OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE STATIONS AND ALL MOVEMENT INTO AND OUT OF EACH STATION AND WILL IMMEDIATELY REPORT ANY DETECTED DIVERGENCY FROM ITS AUTHORIZED ROLE OF VISUAL AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE . . . " WE BELIEVE THE ESSENTIAL US ROLE IS TO VERIFY THAT STATIONS REMAIN SURVEILLANCE STATIONS AND NOT FORTIFIED OUTPOSTS, EXCEPT FOR AUTHORIZED WEAPONS FOR SECURITY. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE OR POSSIBLE FOR S TO COMMIT ITSELF TO DISTINGUISH AMONG VARIOUS POSSIBLE KINDS OF ELECTRONIC ACTIVITY. ALTHOUGH WE MAY BELIEVE ROLE IS

PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE' WE WISH TO AVOID HAVING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THAT AND MORE ACTIVE ELECTRONIC ACTIVITY. IN OUR VIEW, ACTIVE ELECTRONIC ACTIVITY BY EITHER PARTY WOULD QUICKLY BE DETECTED BY THE OTHER GOVERNMENT AND ACTIONS RELATED THERETO HANDLED IN JOINT COMMISSION CHANNELS. FURTHER, US ROLE WILL NOT IN OUR VIEW INVOLVE ANY CONCERN WITH ACTUAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

6. FOR TEL AVIV AND CAIRO: REQUEST YOU APPROACH GENERAL SHAFIR AND MAGHDOUB RESPECTIVELY TO INFORM THEM OF FACT THAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO UN THAT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES BE RAISED AS AGENDA ITEM DURING NEXT JOINT COMMISSION MEETING. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH UNDERSTANDING ON QUESTIONS RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 4, AND THAT DETAILS OF PROCEDURES CAN BE FINALIZED WELL BEFORE FEBURARY 22. THEY SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED DISCUSSION OF THESE DETAILS IN JOINT COMMISSION IN ORDER THAT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AT E-1 AND J-1 SITES HAVE PRECISE SYMMETRY AND THAT THEY BE FULLY UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH PARTIES. US WILL BE GUIDED BY DETERMINATION OF DETAILS OF PROCEDURES REACHED WITHIN
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JOINT COMMISSION.

7. FOR ALL ADDRESSEES: REGRET LATE HOUR AT WHICH WE ARE RAISING THIS SUBJECT AND RECOGNIZE THAT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GET THIS SUBJECT ON THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING ON THE 29TH. IT IS URGENT THAT THIS SUBJECT BE DISCUSSED SOONEST, HOWEVER, AND IF IT PROVES TOO LATE TO ADD TO THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING OF THE 29TH, AT A MINIMUM WE URGE THAT THIS ITEM BE RAISED ON THE 29TH AS AN AGENDA ITEM FOR THE NEXT JOINT COMMISSION MEETING OR AS THE SUBJECT OF A SPECIAL JOINT COMMISSION MEETING. KISSINGER

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